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Adoption of the Securities Act of 1933 1 was widely heralded in
the law reviews and other periodicals.' Amendments in 1934 were also
duly noted.' But amendment proposals in 1941 and 1947 outlining
substantial changes in the registration and prospectus requirements of
the Act have passed largely unnoticed. This may simply mean that
what was important and interesting in 1933 does not necessarily deserve
comment in 1948. We believe, however, that in a private enterprise
economy the basic problem with which the amendment proposals deal-
how to protect public investors "with the least possible interference to
honest business" 4 -merits the attention of the legal profession.' Also,
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1. 48 STAT. 74 (1933), 15 U. S. C. § 77a et seq. (1940), hereinafter cited by sec-
tion number only.
2. E. g., Chamberlain, The Securities Act of 1933, 19 A. B. A, J. 643 (1933);
Douglas and Bates, Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L. J. 171 (1933) ; Hanna
and Turlington, The Securities Act of 1933, 28 ILL. L. REv. 482 (1933) ; Tracy, New
Federal Securities Act, 31 Mica. L. Rav. 1117 (1933) ; Berle, High Finance: Master
or Servant, 23 YALE Rav. 20 (1933) ; Frankfurter, The Federal Securities Act: II, 8
FORTUNE 53 (1933) ; Landis, Securities Act of 1933, 127 BANKERS' MAG. 653 (1933);
Noyes, Wall Street Faces the New Securities Act, 137 NATIOq 20 (1933).
3. E. g., Ballantine, Amending the Federal Securities Act, 20 A. B. A. J. 85
(1934) ; Chilgren, Fereral Securities Act of 1933, As Amended, 2 Jon MARSHALL L.
Q. 105 (1936) ; James, Amendments to Securities Act of 1933, 32 MicH. L. Rav. 1130
(1934) ; Dean, The Amended Securities Act, 10 FORTUNE 80 (1934) ; Flemer, Fight
on the Securities Act, 153 ATl. MONTHLY 232 (1934) ; Seligman, Amend the Securi-
ties Act, 153 ATL. MONTHLY 370 (1934).
4. "The purpose of the legislation I suggest is to protect the public with the least
possible interference to honest business." (Italics supplied.) Message of President
Franklin D. Roosevelt to Congress recommending enactment of securities legislation,
77 CoNG. REa. 937 (1933).
5. In the capitalistic economy of the United States, capital funds must be made
available to business enterprises so that optimum employment and production levels
(609)
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we are not unmindful that public investors are for the most part un-
organized, and that except in rare cases of public catastrophe such
as the 1929 market crash and ensuing depression, their influence on
the legislative process is likely to be negligible. Perhaps an appraisal
by persons not associated with either the securities industry or the ad-
ministrative agency involved will be of some assistance to the legis-
lators who eventually must resolve the problem.6
The amendment proposals are designed to cope with difficulties dis-
closed by experience under the Act. Those difficulties can best be un-
derstood in light of the business and legal setting out of which they
arise. Our discussion of the proposals, therefore, is preceded by a con-
sideration of the background and structure of the Securities Act and
the problems which experience under the Act has disclosed.
I. BACKGROUND AND STRUCTURE OF THE SECURITIES ACT
At the time of the adoption of the Securities Act, the primary
conduit through which American corporate enterprises secured capital
funds from public investors was the investment banker, and the invest-
ment banking process for securing investment funds from the public
included the steps of (1) origination, (2) formation of purchase and
banking groups, and (3) formation of a selling group.7  Although
there were variations in the procedure, these steps may be briefly
summarized as follows:
may be achieved and maintained. The investing public and retained earnings of the
enterprise have been the principal sources of capital funds; quantitatively, the latter
has been the more important source. ABBOTT, FINANCING BUSINESS DURING THE
TRANSITION 13 (1946). See also ALTMAN, SAVING, IN VESTMENT AND NATIONAL IN-
COME 62 (TNEC Monograph 37, 1941).
6. This calls for disclosure of our associations and the origin of this paper.
Although Mr. Byse was a member of the staff of the Commission in 1941-42 and
1945-46, he did not in any way particpate in the amendment program. Mr. Bradley
has never been employed by or associated with either the Commission or the securi-
ties industry. The paper is an outgrowth of a seminar on the Securities Act conducted
by Mr. Byse and attended by Mr. Bradley.
7. See National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 3700, June 13, 1945, pp. 32-39.
8. Our efforts to present a succinct recital of the process of syndicate distribu-
tion may have produced an oversimplified description of the process. The reader who
desires amplification is referred to National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.,
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3700, June 13, 1945, pp. 32-39; testimony of
SEC Commissioner Ganson Purcell, Hearings before Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce on Comparative Print Showing Proposed Changes in the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and H. R. 4344, H. R. 5065,
and H. R. 5832, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-17 (1941), hereinafter called "Hearings";
BISHOP, THE FINANCING OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISES c. 21 (1929); 2 DEWING, FI-
NANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS bk. IV, cc. 7, 8 (4th ed. 1941) ; GALSTON, SECURITY
SYNDICATE OPERATIONS (Rev. ed. 1928) passim; Bates, Some Effects of the Securi-
ties Act Upon Investment Banking Practices, 4 LAw & CONTEmp. PRoD. 72 (1937) ;
Gourrich, Investment Banking Methods Prior to and Since the Securities Act of 1933,
4 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 44 (1937).
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(1) Origination. A corporation needing capital funds would ap-
proach, or be approached by, an investment banker.9 Negotiations
between the corporation and the banker concerning the character and
other details of the financing would ensue." The culmination of these
negotiations generally would be a firm commitment by the banker to
purchase the issue of securities at a stated price." As soon as the
negotiations reached a stage of finality, or while they were being con-
ducted, the banker would initiate the second step in the process.
(2) Formation of purchase and banking groups. Because the
originating banker wished to spread the risk involved in his com-
mitment to the issuer, and perhaps also because of the hope for re-
ciprocal treatment in the distribution of issues to be originated by
members of the group, or to return past favors, he generally organized
a small group *of investment bankers to assist in the purchase of the
securities to be issued. This assistance usually took the form of the
execution and performance of an agreement to purchase the securities
from the originating banker after he had purchased them from the
issuer. In order to compensate and reward the originator, the price to
the purchase syndicate customarily was slightly higher than the price
paid by the originator to the issuer. Further spreading of the risk
attached to the purchase and distribution of the securities was achieved
by the formation of a larger group of investment bankers, called the
banking or underwriting group, to purchase the issue from the pur-
chase group, again at a slightly advanced price. The originator and
other members of the purchase group generally became members of the
banking group.
9. Speaking generally, the relationship between originating broker and corporate
issuer was not sporadic. On the contrary, established issuers had definite, continuing
relationships with investment banking firms, and other bankers ordinarily would not
compete for the business of an issuer having such relationship. 24 Hearings before
Temporary National Economic Committee pursuant to Pub. Res. No. 113 (75th
Cong.), 76th Cong., 3rd Sess. 12482-12487 (1940); LYNCH, THE CONCENTRATION OF
ECONOMIC PowER 84 (1946) ; Gourrich, supra note 8, at 46.
10. During the negotiation stage the careful banker would make an exhaustive
investigation of the issuer in order to determine whether he should underwrite the
issue and to ascertain the price and character of the security which should be issued.
Sometimes, however, the investigation was unduly perfunctory; and sometimes also
investment bankers with no regard for the efficient functioning of industry
forced corporations to accept new capital for expansion purposes in order that new
securities might be issued for public consumption." H. R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. 2 (1933) ; see also Gourrich, supra note 8, at 46-47.
11. But not always. The banker might limit his obligation to an agreement to
take up any securities which the corporation was unable to sell to its own security
holders, or the banker might promise merely to use his "best efforts" to distribute the
issue; and even in those instances where the banker agreed to purchase at a fixed
price, the contract might contain a "market out" clause which privileged the banker
to cancel the agreement in the event of unusual changes in the market.
12. For supporting and amplifying authority, see generally sources cited note 8
supra.
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(3) Formation of selling group.18 Distribution of the securities
to the public was effected by the selling group or syndicate, which con-
sisted of selected members of the securities industry having distributiv8
capacity. Included in the selling syndicate would be (a) those mem-
bers of the banking group who had retailing departments and wished
to participate in the distribution to the public, (b) other investment
bankers with retailing organizations, and (c) securities brokers and
dealers whose primary business was the purchase and sale of securities
for their own account or the account of others. Members of the selling
group would agree to purchase for resale a stated number of securities
at the price specified by the banking group, and a member's liability
was limited to taking up the amount of securities for which he had
subscribed.
The dominant characteristic of this system of selling new issues of
securities was speed of distribution and the consequent minimization of
risks and liabilities incident to carrying an inventory of securities. Un-
like many businesses, an inventory in the case of a distribution of new
securities was and is anathema. The objective was and is to "get
off the hook" as quickly as possible. Or better yet, not to get on in the
first place, which may be accomplished by securing commitments from
purchasers down the distribution line before becoming committed to a
seller up the line. Accordingly, in the 'twenties there were a number of
instances in which the issue or a large part of it was sold to the selling
syndicate almost simultaneously with its purchase from the issuer, and
retailers not unnaturally used similar tactics in selling to the public.' 4
A related anti-social aspect of securities distribution practices
prior to the Securities Act was the inadequacy and falsity of informa-
tion on which the public was expected to base a decision whether or
not to participate in the new issue; reputable as well as "fringe" mem-
bers of the financial community distributed new issues of securities
by means of misleading and inadequate selling literature.' 5 Thus the
public investor was subject not only to the selling pressure engendered
by the emphasis on speedy distribution but also he was not given in-
formation on the basis of which to reach an intelligent decision con-
cerning the security. These and other abuses in the distribution
13. Ibid.
14. Testimony of SEC Commissioner Ganson Purcell, Hearings, supra note 8, at
9; H. R. REP. No. 85, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1933) ; ATK:INS, EDWARDS AND MOUL-
TON, THE REGULATION OF THE SECURITY MARKETS 36 (1946); Saperstein, Govern-
mental Regulation of Investment Banking, FUNDAMENTALS OF INVESTMENT BANK-
ING § 8, p. 7 (Investment Bankers Association of America 1947).
15. Testimony of Commissioner Purcell, Hearings, supra note 8, at 12-14; H. R.
REP. No. 85, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1933) ; SEN. REP. No. 47, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess.
2 (1933); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, INC., THE SECURITY MARKETS 566 (1935).
See also Equitable Life Insurance Co. of Iowa v. Halsey, Stuart & Co., 312 U. S. 410
(1941).
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process,"' coupled with the stock market debacle of 1929, the ensuing
depression, and the demonstrated ineffectiveness of state regulation,
gave rise to the Securities Act of 1933.
The Securities Act is directed primarily at securities distribution
as distinguished from securities trading, and is designed to remedy the
abuses in securities distribution discussed above. The basic means for
achieving that objective are the registration and prospectus require-
ments of Section 5 of the Act. Broadly speaking, Section 5 as im-
plemented by other sections of the Act 17 makes it unlawful for issuers,
underwriters, and dealers to distribute a new issue of securities to the
investing public by use of the mails or channels of interstate commerce
unless "a registration statement is in effect as to" the issue. Nor may
such persons use the mails or channels of commerce to transmit selling
literature concerning a registered security (i. e., a security as to which
a "registration statement is iii effect"), or to deliver a registered
security after sale, unless the selling literature or security is accom-
panied or preceded by a prospectus summarizing the more essential in-
formation contained in the registration statement.'" The objective
of the registration and prospectus requirements of the Act is outlined
in the report of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee
recommending enactment of the Securities Act: "The purpose of these
sections is to secure for potential buyers the means of understanding
the intricacies of the transaction into which they are invited. The full
revelations required in the filed 'registration statement' should not be
lost in the actual selling process. This requirement will undoubtedly
limit the selling arguments hitherto employed. That is its pur-
pose. . . . Any objection that the compulsory incorporation in selling
literature and sales argument of substantially all information concern-
ing the issue, will frighten the buyer with the intricacy bf the trans-
action, states one of the best arguments for the provision. The rank
16. E. g., the practice of pegging or stabilizing the price of a new or secondary
distribution of securities. See generally, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 2446,
March 18, 1940.
17. See especially § 2(3) defining "sale" and kindred terms, note 65 infra; § 2(10)
defining "prospectus"; § 4 exempting certain transactions from the provisions of § 5;
§ 10 specifying the information to be contained in a prospectus.
18. There are two exceptions to this broad prohibition: the so-called "tombstone
advertisement" and the newspaper prospectus. The former is a ". . notice, circu-
lar, advertisement, letter, or communication in respect of a security . . . [which]
states from whom a written prospectus meeting the requirements of section 10 may be
obtained and, in addition, does no more than identify the security, state the price there-
of, and state by whom orders will be executed." § 2(10). A newspaper prospectus is
defined by the Commission as ". . . an advertisement of securities in newspapers,
magazines, or other periodicals which are admitted to the mails as second-class matter
and which are not distributed by the advertiser." "Instructions as to Newspaper
Prospectuses" of Form S-1. The "Instructions" permit condensation and omission of
certain information required to be included in a prospectus meeting the requirements
of Section 10.
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and file of securities buyers who have hitherto bought blindly should
be made aware that securities are intricate merchandise." 9
A security may be registered by filing with the Commission a
registration statement containing information concerning every es-
sentially important element attending the issue of the new security.2"
The registration statement does not become effective until twenty days
after it has been filed with the Commission.21 If within the twenty-
day period an amendment to the registration statement is filed, the
entire statement is deemed to have been filed on the date the amend-
ment was filed, thereby starting the running of a new twenty-day
period.2 However, if the amendment is filed with the "consent...
or pursuant to an order of the Commission," the twenty days is
measured from the date of the original filing of the registration state-
ment.2" Therefore, during the twenty days after filing-longer if
amendments were filed and the Commission failed to "consent" or
"order"--detailed information concerning the security to be issued is
filed with a Government agency 24 and is available for public
inspection.25
As understood by the draftsmen of the Act, the purpose of the
twenty-day "waiting" or "cooling" period was to arrest the high pres-
sure distribution practices then in vogue: "The compulsory. . . [20-
day] inspection period before securities can be sold is deliberately in-
tended to interfere with the reckless traditions of the last few years of
the securities business. It contemplates a change from methods of dis-
tribution lately in vogue which attempted complete sale of an issue
sometimes within one day or at most a few days. Such methods
practically compelled minor distributors, dealers, and even salesmen,
as the price of participation in future issues of the underwriting house
involved, to make commitments blindly. This has resulted in the
demoralization of ethical standards as between these ultimate sales
outlets and the securities-buying public to whom they had to look to
take such commitments off their hands. This high-pressure technique
has assumed an undue importance in the eyes of the present genera-
,tion of securities distributors, with its reliance upon delicate calcula-
19. H. R. REP,. No. 85, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1933).
20. Sections 6 and 7.
21. As originally enacted section 8(a) provided, as stated in the text, that the
effective date of the registration statement would be the twentieth day after filing.
Hower, the section was amended in 1940 to give the Commission discretionary author-
ity to accelerate the effective date under certain circumstances without regard to the
original 20-day period. See page 619 and note 48 infra.
22. Section 8(a).
23. Ibid.
24. The period may be less than twenty days if the Commission exercises its dis-
cretionary authority to accelerate the effective date. See note 21 supra.
25. Rules 120 and 121 of General Rules and Regulations under the Securities Act
of 1933, 17 CODE FED. REGS. §§ 230.120, 230.121 (Cum. Supp. 1943).
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tions of day-to-day fluctuations in market opportunities and its implicit
temptations to market manipulation, and must be discarded because
the resulting injury to an underinformed public demonstrably hurts
the Nation. It is furthermore the considered judgment of this com-
mittee that any issue that cannot stand the test of a waiting inspection
over. . . [a 20-day] average of economic conditions, but must be
floated within a few days upon the crest of a possibly manipulated
market fluctuation, is not a security which deserves protection at the
cost of the public as compared with other issues which can meet this
test." 26
The structure of the Act and its legislative history make it clear
that speed of distribution was to be curbed by the waiting period. The
same sources demonstrate that the related evil of distributing securities
to public investors through the use of inadequate, misleading, and false
information was to be remedied by requirements (enforced by adminis-
trative,27 civil liability,2" injunctive,29 and criminal 0 sanctions) that
new issues be registered and that the more essential information con-
tained in the registration statement be furnished to purchasers in the
form of a prospectus complying with rather rigorous statutory and
administrative standards.
Wherein, if at all, have these apparently admirable remedial meas-
ures failed? Why is it that in 1947 the Chairman of the Commission
could say, "We do not think the laws passed in 1933 are working as
they were intended to work," "1 and another member of the Commission,
" .. . [the] basic intention [of the Act] is frustrated"? 82 Why have
members of the securities industry, although expressing full agreement
with the objectives of the Act, pressed for revision? " Answers to
these questions may be found in the problems and difficulties-ap-
26. H. R. REP. No. 85, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1933).
27. Sections 8(b) and 8(d). See also §§ 15(b) and 15A(1) (2) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 780(b)
(1940) and 52 STAT. 1075 (1938), 15 U. S. C. § 780-3(1) (2) (1940), providing that
the Commission may deny or revoke the registration of any broker or dealer or sus-
pend or expel from the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., any member
of the Association if it finds that the broker, dealer or member ". . . has wilfully
violated any provision of the Securities Act of 1933 . . . or of any rule or regula-
tion thereunder .
28. Sections 11 and 12.
29. Section 20 (b). See also § 17.
30. Section 24. See also § 17.
31. Statement of Chairman James J. Caffrey, reported in Ayers, Hope Dims for
the Early Revision of the Securities Act, FINANCE 27, 28 (April 25, 1947).
32. Statement of Commissioner Robert K. McConnaughey in an address before
the American Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc., Chicago, Illinois, March 26, 1947,
p. 5 of mimeographed release of address.
33. REPORT ON THE CONFERENCES WITH THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COM-
MISSION AND ITS STAFF ON PROPOSALS FOR AMENDING THE SEcuRITIEs ACT OF 1933
AND THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF INVESTMENT
BANKERS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, NATIONAL AssocIATIoN OF SECURITIES DEALERS,
INC., NEW YORK CuRB EXCHANGE, AND NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE (1941), here-
inafter called "INDUSTRY REPORT." See note 61 infra.
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parently unforeseen, or if foreseen, not fully appreciated, by the drafts-
men of the statute-which experience under the Act has disclosed.
II. PROBLEMS DISCLOSED BY EXPERIENCE UNDER THE ACT
The legislative history of the Act indicates that the Congress in-
tended that public investors should be provided with a prospectus con-
taining full information concerning a registered security before buying
the security, and that until the registration statement was in effect no
attempts should be made to dispose of a security. Complete attain-
ment of these objectives has been thwarted by the following factors:
(1) the so-called "oral loophole"; (2) the difficulties inherent in the
"dissemination-solicitation" distinction established by the Act; and (3)
"gun beating." 84
A. The So-called "Oral Loophole"
Section 5 (b), as implemented by Sections 2 (3) and 2 (10),
closes the mails and channels of interstate commerce to all written
offers or attempts to dispose of a registered security, unless the writing
is accompanied or has been preceded by a prospectus meeting the re-
quirements of Section 10. However, if the offer or attempt to dispose
of the security is made orally, either in personal conversation or by
telephone, the only requirement imposed by the Act is that if the mails
or channels of commerce are used to deliver the security to the pur-
chaser, a Section 10 prospectus must accompany or precede the
security. 5 Consequently, where the seller does not utilize written
communications in selling the security, the buyer need receive no pro-
spectus until the security is delivered to him after he has purchased
the security. And, of course, if the seller does not use the mails or
channels of interstate commerce in making offers or sales or in deliver-
ing the security, either before or after the effective date, the prohibi-
tions of Section 5 are inapplicable. 6
34. An additional factor hampering full realization of the objective of the Act
"to place adequate and true information before the investor," SEN. REP. No. 47, 73rd
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933), has been the inordinate size and complexity of many pro-
spectuses. An analysis of prospectuses registered with the Commission during the year
1940 showed that the average prospectus was a document of 41 pages. Testimony of
R. McLean Stewart, Chairman, Securities Act Committee, IBA. Hearings, supra note
8, at 144, 169. The ordinary investor probably will not carefully peruse a document
of that magnitude; and, of course, to the extent that he is deterred from doing so, the
objective of the Act is not realized.
35. See §§5(b), 2(3) and 2(10).
36. That intrastate offerings are often made before effectiveness may be inferred
from the following statements of the securities industry: "When a registration state-
ment relating to a proposed new issue of securities is filed with the Commission, the
Commission makes a practice of announcing the fact immediately in the press. If the
contemplated offering is one of attractive quality, investors throughout the country
turn at once to their security dealers to seek information concerning it and possibly
to ask that offerings be made to them at the appropriate time. The great majority of
conversations as to such securities, which occur prior to the effective date of a regis-
AMENDMENT PROPOSALS FOR SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 617
To the extent that new issues are sold through oral negotiations,8
7
the Act's professed objective of providing public investors with suffi-
cient information to reach informed judgments is not effectuated.
Although detailed data concerning the percentage of newly issued
securities sold orally is not available, the following statement of the
securities industry is revealing: "With respect to the greatest per-
centage of new issue securities measured by dollar amount. . . busi-
ness between buyer and seller is normally conducted by telephone." "
This opinion by qualified observers indicates that despite the existence
of the Securities Act, a large number-perhaps, in the language of the
industry statement, "the greatest percentage"--of public investors pur-
chase newly issued securities without full benefit of the disclosure
provisions of the Act.89
The Commission apparently believes that the failure to regulate
interstate oral offerings of registered securities represents a Congres-
sional oversight and error in draftsmanship.4" The securities industry,
pointing to the deletion of provisions in earlier drafts of the Act
which would have regulated oral offerings, argues that Congress
deliberately chose not to impose such "an unnecessary and perhaps im-
possible restriction . . . upon business." 4 We do not think it neces-
sary to attempt a resolution of this controversy. The point is that
under the Act a multitude of public investors still are not provided
tration statement, ordinarily take place in personal interviews or over local telephones.
They do not involve the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce
or of the mails. Consequently they are now, and have always been, permissible under
the provisions of the Securities Act." INDUSTRY REPORT, supra note 33, at ix. See
also text at note 38 infra; and see note 59 infra.
37. Or where the Act is inapplicable because the jurisdictional means of the mails
or channels of interstate commerce are not utilized. See note 36 supra and text thereat.
38. INDUSTRY REPORT, supra note 33, at viii; testimony of R. McLean Stewart,
Hearings, supra note 8, at 144. See also suggestions for Revision of the Securities Act
of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 of the Committee on Security Regu-
lation of Commerce and Industry Association of New York, Inc., March 28, 1947, p. 2:
. . . the general practice is to send the prospectus to the investor with the con-
firmation of sale, that is after he has bought the security. . . . Hence, the investor
generally makes his commitment to buy in reliance solely upon the oral representations
of the salesman." See also note 36 supra.
39. The recent Kaiser-Frazer stock offering provides a graphic example of the
importance of supplying purchasers with prospectuses before they are committed to
purchase. The public offering date of the 900,000 share issue at $13.00 per share was
February 4, 1948. On February 3, the issuer in stabilizing transactions purchased
186,200 shares of its stock, holding the price to $13.50 per share. At noon on Feb-
ruary 4, the underwriters announced that the entire 900,000 shares had been placed at
the offering price of $13.00. That afternoon, after stabilizing transactions no longer
were supporting the price, the stock fell to $11.25 per share, closing at $11.75. As
credulous as public investors may be, it seems clear that many offerees of this stock
who agreed to purchase it would not have done so had they been informed that the
volume of the stabilization was approximately 20% of the total issue. See N. Y.
Times, Feb. 4, p. 33, col. 5; Feb. 5, p. 33, col. 5; Feb. 15, § 3, p. 1, col. 7, p. 3, col. 4.
40. SEC, REPORT ON PROPOSALS FOR AmENDMENTS TO THE SECURITIES AcT OF
1933 AND THE SEcURITIEs EXCHANGE AcT OF 1934, 5 (1941), hereinafter called Com-
miSSION REPORT. See note 61 infra.
41. Testimony of R. McLean Stewart, Hearings, supra note 8, at 139-140. See
also INausTRY REPORT, .rupra note 33, at viii.
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with information concerning the securities they are asked to purchase.
Any program of revising the registration and prospectus requirements
of Section 5 and related sections must give consideration to this fact.
B. The Dissemination-Solicitation Distinction
Until the effective date of a registration statement, it is unlawful
to use the mails or channels of interstate commerce to offer to sell,
attempt to dispose of, solicit an offer to buy, or offer to buy the
security.42 But a major purpose of the Act is to provide investors with
information. It is proper, therefore, to disseminate information con-
erning the proposed issue to prospective purchasers prior to the effec-
tive date.43 But if the dissemination of information actually constitutes
an "offer to sell," "an attempt or offer to dispose of a security," or a
"solicitation of an offer to buy," then Section 5 has been violated and
the violator is subject to civil, injunctive, criminal, and administrative
sanctions.44 What then should be the course of action by a prudent
securities dealer who has received information from an investment
banker (with whom he has enjoyed friendly and profitable business
relations in the past) that the banker is participating in the underwrit-
ing of a new issue of securities? Should he disseminate information
concerning the issue to his customers and thereby take the risk that a
jury, judge, or administrative agency viewing the transaction from
the vantage point of hindsight will determine that he was not merely
disseminating information but really had made "an attempt to offer
or to dispose of" the security or a "solicitation of an offer to buy"?
Although there is little or no evidence that this risk has deterred
dealers from disseminating information to their customers, one must
sympathize with the plaint of a spokesman for the industry: "In prac-
tice the present law has created an extremely unsatisfactory situa-
tion. . . It has made honest men feel ashamed of themselves by
compelling them to resort to subterfuges, obliging them to ask their
best friends, with whom they deal, to believe them when they go to
them and give them information, but at the same time say to them:
'Look, we are not trying to sell you a security. We do not want to
offer a security to you. We do not want you to make us an offer to
buy. We merely want to supply you with information.' "45
42. Sections 5(a) and 2(3).
43. See H. R.,RtP. No. 85, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1933) : "lhe bill . . . is
not concerned with communications which merely describe a security. It is, there-
fore, possible for underwriters who wish to inform a selling group or dealers generally
of the nature of a security that will be offered for sale after the effective date of the
registration statement, to circulate among them full information respecting such a
security." See also Securities Act Release No. 70, November 6, 1933, and Securities
Act Release No. 464, August 19, 1935.
44. See §§ 5 and 2(3) and notes 27-30 supra.
45. Testimony of R. McLean Stewart, Hearings, supra note 8, at 136-137.
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Far more serious has been the effect on underwriters' practices.
They too are subject to the risk that a dissemination to prospective
members of the selling group may later be determined to have been an
attempt to dispose of the security or a solicitation of an offer to buy.
As a result, in the past some underwriters have not disseminated any
information until the effective date. 6 It may be argued that the ap-
prehensions of this group were unjustified, that they need have had no
fear if in fact they were merely disseminating information. But jus-
tifiable or not-and certainly the line between dissemination and solici-
tation is not so clear and precise that the action of this group of under-
writers can be termed unreasonable-the point is that underwriters'
failure or reluctance t9 disseminate information makes it increasingly
difficult for the securities industry and the investing public to appraise
the security before the actual selling process begins; and this, of course,
is contrary to the objective of the Act to facilitate appraisal of the
security during the waiting period.
7
Further impetus to non-dissemination of information during the
waiting period was provided by action taken by the Commission in
1945. In 1940, Section 8 (a) was amended to give the Commission
discretion to reduce the waiting period to less than twenty days in
appropriate instances.4" On April 30, 1945, the Commission issued a
statement of general policy outlining the way in which it would exercise
the discretion vested in it by the amendment, in passing upon requests
for acceleration in cases in which a so-called "red-herring" pro-
spectus " had been circulated in a form which did not meet the stand-
ards of disclosure required by the Securities Act. The statement
provided in part: "In considering a request for acceleration of the
effective date of a registration statement in a case where a 'red-herring'
prospectus which was inaccurate or inadequate in material respects has
been circulated the Commission considers that the statutory standards
of this section [8 (a)] have not been met. Accordingly, the Com-
46. INDUSTRY REPORT, supra note 33, at 89.
47. Cf. Saperstein, supra note 14, at 15.
48. 54 STAT. 857, 15 U. S. C. § 77h (a) (1940). The amendment directed the Com-
mission, in exercising its discretion on applications to reduce the waiting period, to
give ". . due regard to the adequacy of information respecting the issuer thereto-
fore available to the public, to the facility with which the nature of the securities to be
registered, their relationship to the capital structure of the issuer and the rights of
holders thereof can be understood, and to the public interest and the protection of
investors."
49. A "red herring" prospectus is a document which describes the security in ap-
proximately the same terms as it is described in a prospectus conforming to the re-
quirements of Section 10; often the red herring is incomplete in that it does not contain
information concerning price and the other items listed in note 53 infra. The name
"red herring" comes from the practice of printing in red letters diagonally across every
page of the prospectus, or along the margin, the statement that the prospectus is not
an offer of the security or a solicitation of an offer to buy, and that it is for informa-
tive purposes only.
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mission will not order acceleration in such a case until it has received
satisfactory assurances that by appropriate means the nature of the
material amendments to the registration statement have been com-
municated to those persons to whom the 'red-herring' prospectus was
distributed." 50
The objective of this procedure was to discourage the circulation
of inadequate red herrings and to correct misapprehensions resulting
from deficient red herrings. But compliance with its terms was no
easy task: because, if dealers to whom red herrings had been forwarded
further distributed them to their customers, it would be extremely
difficult for the underwriter to give the required "satisfactory assur-
ances" that corrections had been communicated to all the recipients of
the red herring. This would be especially true in cases of large issues
in which the red herrings had received nationwide distribution. "Ac-
cordingly, underwriters grew more and more reluctant to jeopardize
the granting of requests for acceleration by setting in motion a process
which made it difficult for them to supply satisfactory assurances that
later amendments had been communicated to all persons to whom the
red herrings were distributed. It was simpler, many underwriters
believed, to abandon the red herring altogether." "
The Commission's move to remedy this unsatisfactory condition
was adoption of Rule 131, effective December 6, 1946.52 Rule 131
provides that sending or giving to any person, before a registration
statement becomes effective, a copy of the proposed form of prospectus
(i. e., the red-herring prospectus) filed as a part of the registration
statement, shall not in itself constitute an offer or attempt to dispose of
a security or solicitation of an offer to buy if the proposed form of
prospectus contains substantially the information required to be set
forth in a Section 10 prospectus, or contains substantially all that in-
formation with certain exceptions.58 The Commission announcement
of adoption of the Rule also indicated that unless copies of the proposed
form of prospectus were distributed, a reasonable time in advance of
the anticipated effective date, to all underwriters and dealers who might
be invited to participate in the distribution, the Commission would re-
50. Securities Act Release No. 3061, April 30, 1945.
51. Saperstein, supra note 14, at 17. See also Parlin, Security Issues and Ex-
changes, ANNUAL SURVEy OF AMERICAN LAW, 530, 533 (1946).
52. Securities Act Release No. 3177, December 5, 1946. The Release stated that
the Rule would be effective for a trial period of six months. On July 10, 1947, the
Commission announced continuation of the Rule. Securities Act Release No. 3240,
July 10, 1947.
53. The exceptions pertain to information concerning the offering price, under-
writing discounts or commissions, discounts or commissions to dealers, amount of
proceeds, conversion rates, call prices, or other matters dependent upon the offering
price.
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fuse to accelerate the effective date of the registration statement.
54
Because acceleration often is crucially important to a registrant,"' the
sanction of non-acceleration has generally been sufficient to induce
underwriting groups to distribute copies of the proposed form of pro-
spectus to prospective members of selling groups.
Notwithstanding the general effectiveness of this solution of the
unsatisfactory situation precipitated by the policy announcement of
April 30, 1945, the basic problems inherent in the dissemination-
solicitation distinction still remain. Underwriters and dealers still
are subject to the risk that a hindsight determination will reveal that
their dissemination activities fell within the prohibited area of attempt
or solicitation. To the extent that distributors of securities feel that
this is a substantial risk, they very likely will limit their dissemination
to the minimum necessary to secure acceleration. At the other
extreme, the Act's authorization of dissemination of information during
the waiting period facilitates evasion of the prohibition against at-
tempted disposition and solicitation, and may result in an unfair dis-
crimination against the law-abiding member of the securities industry
in favor of the law-evading member. This aspect of the dissemination-
solicitation problem, which receives special treatment in the following
discussion of "gun beating," is of far greater consequence than the
phases of the problem discussed above.
C. "'Gun Beating"
"Beating the gun" consists of offering or otherwise attempting to
dispose of newly issued securities before the date of the public offering'.
Prior to the Securities Act, the practice constituted a breach of the
syndicate agreement; and because purchase group members were in a
position to secure detailed information concerning the new issue before
the same information was made available to other members of the
selling group, gun beating apparently was more widely engaged in by
retail departments of members of the purchase syndicate than by
smaller securities dealers, whose participation in the distribution was
54. The Release also stated that the Commission would continue its policy enun-
ciated in Release No. 3061 of refusing acceleration where materially inaccurate or
inadequate red herrings have been circulated until corrected information has been
communicated to those persons to whom the deficient red herring had been distributed.
55. Dean, The Lawyer's Problem in the Registration of Securities, 4 LAW &
CoNTEmP. PRon. 154, 168 n. 29 (1937) : "Inasmuch as underwriters do not like to carry
commitments for any longer period than is necessary and since the time factor is of
tremendous importance in the success of an issue, it is essential that amendments be
cleared with the Commission as rapidly as possible and their consent obtained to the
filing thereof. Otherwise, the filing of each amendment (and delay usually causes
change in the public offering price) would start a new twenty-day period running so
that, unless the consent of the Commission be obtained, the statement would never
become effective."
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limited to membership in the selling group." After the Act, the prac-
tice constitutes a violation of Section 5; 7 and because the Act and
Commission regulations encourage dissemination of information con-
cerning the issue to prospective members of the selling group during
the waiting period, smaller securities dealers, as well as the larger retail
departments, are now able to beat the gun.
Dissemination of information during the waiting period thus
facilitates gun beating, and gun beating is directly contrary to the ob-
jective of the Act that the waiting period should be a time for apprais-
ing, not for selling. Paradoxically, then, dissemination of information,
encouraged by both the Act and Commission regulations, is conducive
to violations of the Act. If gun beating is a common practice in the
distribution of new issues of securities, the Act is in a measure self-
defeating, because the procedure, clearly contemplated by the Act, of
disseminating information during the waiting period becomes the
vehicle for a return to the high pressure, blind buying practices which
the Act was designed to eliminate.
We do not know how pervasive gun beating is. Investment
bankers and securities dealers do not announce from housetops that
they have not conformed to the law of the land. Nor can the Com-
mission charged with the task of enforcement be expected to state
publicly that the statute is commonly violated.58 Yet, we feel that the
available evidence supports the judgment that gun beating is wide-
spread.5 9 The general availability of information concerning new
56. GALSTON, op. cit. supra note 8, at 123-124; WILLIS AND BOGEN, INVESTMENT
BANKING 482 (Rev. ed. 1936).
57. Because the effective date and the public offering date generally coincide, and
assuming, of course, that the jurisdictional means of the mails or channels of interstate
commerce are used.
58. But see N. Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1936, p. 23, col. 8, "SEC Says 60 Firms 'Beat
Gun' in Sales."
59. We are not in possession of the facilities which would enable us definitely to
confirm our belief that gun beating is widespread. Definite corroboration of that belief
would involve a thorough investigation undertaken pursuant to statutory authority
providing for the issuance of subpoenas and for immunity from subsequent prosecution
on account of any transaction concerning which the subpoenaed individual might pro-
duce evidence. See, e. g., Sections 19(b) and 22(a) of the Act. However, as stated in
the text, we are convinced that the practice is pervasive. Our conviction rests upon
the following:
(1) Information secured from members of the securities industry and members
of the Conmission's staff. Although not all those questioned were responsive, none
affirmed that gun beating was not widespread, and several stated that it was very preva-
lent.
(2) Statements by industry and Commission representatives. See, e. g., state-
ment of SEC Commissioner Robert K. McConnaughey: "Although it would probably
be difficult to prove in particular cases, it is not uncommon for underwriters to make
their commitments to issuers, to invite orders or indications of interest from dealers,
and for dealers to solicit orders for their allotments and make allocations to ultimate
investors before registration becomes effective." Address before the American Society
of Corporate Secretaries, Inc., Chicago, Ill., March 26, 1947, p. 5 of mimeographed
release of address. See also REPORT OF SECURITIES AcT COMMITTEE OF INVESTMENT
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issues, the understandable reaction of otherwise law-abiding members
of the securities business to meet the competition of gun beaters with
more gun beating, the natural reluctance of a securities dealer to reject
the importunacies of investors avid for new issues, the tenuous distinc-
tion between solicitation and dissemination, the difficulty of proving
BANKERS ASSOCIATION OF AaRIcA 9, 44 (June 1, 1940) ; address of John J. Bums,
then General Counsel of the Commission before the Securities Traders Association,
Cincinnati, Ohio, August 1, 1935, p. 5 of mimeographed release of address; address
of Murray Hanson, General Counsel, Investment Bankers Association of America,
before the Eleventh Annual Central States Group Conference Investment Bankers
Association of America, Chicago, Ill., March 14, 1947, text reported in 165 ComMi.ER.
& FIN. CHRON., March 20, 1947, pp. 1513, 1530.
(3) Statements in public and trade press. E. g., 165 Comm. & FIN. CHRON.,
May 8, 1947, p. 2522: "In a sense, both the underwriters and the SEC realize that
the whole system of underwriting new security issues involving the use of the pro-
spectus to safeguard, supposedly, the interests of the investor has broken down com-
pletely. Permission to seek 'intention to buy' . . . [from prospective purchasers,
i. e., to beat the gun] would in effect only legalize prevailing trade custom even now,
trade custom, by the way, which even the SEC has sanctioned with one eye closed
so to speak." See also Investment Dealers' Digest, April 22, 1940, p. 3, quoted in 2
D-wING, op. cit. supra note 8, at 1134 n. k; N. Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1936, p. 23, col. 8.
(4) Comments of students of the investment banking process. E. g., Ayers, SEC
Proposes to Amend Heart of Securities Act, FINANCE, June 10, 1947, pp. 25, 41:
"[The proposal] . . . legalizes a practice which has been widespread even though it
was contrary to the law, namely the conversations between salesmen and prospective
customers between registration and effective date." Heilbron, Strengthen the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 (undated monograph) 3: "Where such a hair-line distinction was
drawn between 'informative' and 'selling' literature, it was not unreasonable to learn
of violations. 'Jumping the gun' became fairly common." See also Bates, Some Effects
of the Securities Act Upon Investment Banking Practices, 4 LA-w & CONTEMP. PRoa.
72, 73 (1937) ; Kuhn, The Securities Act and Its Effect Upon the Institutional In-
vestor, id. 80, 83; 2 DEWING, op. cit. supra note 8, at 1133-1134, note k; WEIssMAN,
THE NEw WAIL STRET 235-236 (1923).
See also In the Matter of Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., Securitiep Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 3791, Feb. 28, 1946, 56 YALE L. J. 156 (1946). Approximately a month and
a half before filing of the registration statement, Van Alstyne, Noel & Co. (here-
after called "respondent") arranged with Andrew J. Higgins to underwrite 900,000
shares of Higgins, Inc. About three weeks later respondent arranged for widespread
publicity concerning the issue to be disseminated by means of the Dow-Jones ticker
and the newspapers; respondent also communicated with a large number of dealers
throughout the country to inform them concerning the issue and to inquire whether
they wished to participate. Shortly thereafter respondent completed the formation of
a nationwide selling group of about 160 dealers; some dealers who communicated
with respondent were allotted specific amounts of stocks totalling 104,500 shares,
and they in turn allotted specific amounts to their customers. Also, respondent
through its own retail department received offers from its own customers, and entered
on its books "buy" orders for an aggregate of 2,600 shares. Finally, the registration
statement was filed. The Commission then instituted proceedings pursuant to Sec-
tions 15 (b) and 15A(1) (2) of the Securities Exchange Act to determine whether re-
spondent had wilfully violated Section 5 of the Securities Act. See note 27 supra.
The Commission found that respondent had wilfully violated Section 5.
We do not know whether the procedure followed by the Van Alstyne, Noel firm
in the Higgins underwriting is representative of underwriting practices generally.
Perhaps the firm made its mistake in utilizing the Dow-Jones ticker and the news-
papers in publicizing its violations of Section 5. The Commission could hardly be ex-
pected to disregard such a flouting of the Act. It is not without interest and possibly
of considerable significance that in a statement to the press, Richard C. Noel, a senior
partner in the firm, stated, "In forming the underwriting group to purchase and pub-
licly offer stock of Higgins, Inc., our procedure was in all respects in line with our
regular course of business and was, we believe, the same procedure followed by sub-
stantially all other underwriting houses doing a similar business." N. Y. Times, Feb.
7, 1946, p. 33, col. 3.
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oral and telephone conversations, the reluctance of a purchaser,
especially if he be a member of the securities industry, to "welsh" on his
commitment, and the deeply rooted desire of underwriters and dealers
to minimize their risks by securing commitments down the distribu-
tion line before committing themselves to their vendors-all these fac-
tors, in our opinion, have contributed to a general disregard of the
provisions of the Act which proscribe selling activities before the effec-
tive date. Although the analogy is far from perfect, the situation is
not unlike that of prohibition. A law designed to effect drastic changes
in human conduct fails when the standard of conduct established by the
law deviates too far from the mores of the community.6"
Assuming that our opinion concerning the extensiveness of gun
beating is substantially correct, the following are factors which a pro-
gram of revision should take into consideration:
(1) Under the present Act, because of the oral loophole and
the distributive practices of the business, public purchasers gen-
erally are committed to buy before they have had an opportunity
to examine a statutory (i. e. Section 10) prospectus.
(2) The tenuous character of the solicitation-dissemination
distinction has made some members of the securities industry re-
luctant to disseminate information during the waiting period. The
distinction also presents serious enforcement problems and has
contributed to the growth of gun beating.
(3) Gun beating, which violates the Act if the jurisdictional
means of the mails or channels or commerce are used, should
either be curbed or legalized.
(4) The public investor who so desires should be given suffi-
cient information to enable him to reach an intelligent decision
whether to purchase a security.
(5) Although public investors must be protected, remedial
measures must be adjusted to the basic needs and practices of the
American economy; the measures must be neither so restrictive or
expensive as to impose unjustified or impractical burdens on the
investment process, nor so divergent from the mores of the regu-
lated community as to exceed the limits of effective legal action.
60. Cf. address of John J. Bums, then General Counsel of SEC, before Conven-
tion of IBA, White Sulphur Springs, W. Va., October 28, 1935, p. 5 of mimeographed
release of address: "Theoretically, perhaps, some might say that if the law declares
certain conduct to be unlawful, the discussion is ended. One has but to choose his
place with the saints or sinners. But as a practical matter, we all recognize that the
statutory regulation of human conduct must lean heavily upon the normal attitudes and
actions of men and that the sanction of law rests largely on the inherent reasonable-
ness of the statute itself."
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III. SUMMARY OF AMENDMENT PROPOSALS
Of the various suggestions that have been advanced for amend-
ing the registration and prospectus requirements of Section 5 and
related sections of the Securities Act, the following,61 which have re-
ceived the greatest attention from Congress, the securities industry
61. The background of these proposals is as follows: In 1940 Representative
Clarence F. Lea requested the Commission to comment on bills proposing amendments
to the Securities Act which had been referred to the Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, of which he was Chairman. Replying to this request, the Com-
mission suggested that its comments be deferred until it had discussed the proposed
amendments and other proposals to amend the Securities Act and the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 with representatives of the securities industry. The President of
the Investment Bankers Association of America (IBA) wrote Mr. Lea expressing
agreement with the Commission's suggestion. Representatives of the Commission, of
IBA and of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) thereafter
reached agreement concerning a proposal to amend § 8(a) of the Securities Act. This
proposal was embodied in H. R. 10276, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. and became law on August
22, 1940, as Title III of PuB. L. 768, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 54 STAT. 857, 15 U. S. C.
§ 77h(a) (1940).
Following this, discussions were resumed between representatives of the Commis-
sion, IBA, NASD, the New York Stock Exchange and the New York Curb Exchange
concerning the proposed amendments to the Securities Act and the Securities Ex-
change Act. Although these discussions brought agreement with respect to some pro-
posed amendments, the Commission and the securities industry, represented by the
above groups, were unable to reconcile their differences concerning a number of pro-
posals, including revision of the registration and prospectus requirements of Section 5
and related sections of the Securities Act. At the conclusion of their conferences, the
Commission and the industry each submitted a detailed statement of its position to the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce: CommissI N REPORT, supra
note 40; INDUSTRY REPORT, supra note 33.
The proposals of the Commission and of the industry were embodied in a Com-
PARATIVE PRINT SHOWING PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE SEcuRITIES AcT OF 1933 AND
THE SEcURITIEs ExCHrANGE AcT OF 1934, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., hereinafter called
"COMPARATIVE PRINT." The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
began hearings on the COmPARATrVE PRINT on October 28, 1941. Hearings, supra
note 8.
After compiling a record of over 1500 pages, the Committee closed the hearings
on January 27, 1942. Presumably because of the exigencies of the war, the Committee
made no recommendation to the House of Representatives, and no legislation resulted.
On January 17, 1947, the Commission announced resumption of the program inter-
.rupted by the war for joint study of the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange
Act with groups of persons interested in the operation of those Acts. Securities Act
Release No. 3188, January 17, 1947. Between that date and June 6, 1947, the Com-
mission and members of its staff conferred with interested representatives of the secu-
rities industry and with other interested pqrsons; unlike the 1940-41 conferences,
which considered a wide range of amendment proposals (forty-eight proposals relat-
ing to the Securities Act and thirty-six relating to the Securities Exchange Act) the
principal subjects of the 1947 discussions have been the registration and prospectus
requirements of Section 5 and related sections of the Securities Act.
On June 6, 1947, the Commission made public an ". . . outline of tentative pro-
posals for amending the registration and prospectus requirements of Section 5 and re-
lated Sections of the Securities Act of 1933.' Securities Act Release No. 3224, June
6, 1947. The outline was prepared by a committee appointed by the Commission from
members of its staff to give special attention to the amendment program. In releasing
the outline of tentative proposals, the Commission emphasized that the document did
not purport to express either unanimous or final views of the staff committee; the
Commission also requested comment from interested persons. It is our understanding
that IBA, NASD, and other interested parties did inform the Commission concerning
their views of the proposals. However, up to the time this article went to press, no
further information had been made public concerning the nature of the comments sub-
mitted or concerning the views of the Commission or its staff.
There is set forth below the membership of the Commission during the two gen-
eral.periods, 1940-41 and 1947, in which amendment proposals have been the subject of
discussions between the Commission and the securities industry.
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and the Commission, merit further consideration here: (1) Industry
proposals of 1941; (2) Commission counter-proposal of 1941; and (3)
Commission staff proposals of 1947.
A. Industry Proposals of 1941 62
(1) During the Waiting Period 6
The industry was perturbed over the uncertainties engendered by
the dissemination-solicitation distinction.64 Its proposals, therefore,
were in part designed to remove those uncertainties. To do so, the
industry recommended that Section 2 (3) of the Act be amended to
separate the definition of the term "offer to sell" from that of the term
"sale." 65
(a) Offers. The industry then proposed to change Section 5 so
as to permit "offers" during the waiting period.66 Such offers could
be made by means of an "identifying statement"; or in other written
or oral forms, provided that the "offer" was incorporated in, accom-
June 1, 1940-Dec. 31, 1941 1947
Jerome Frank, Chairman (resigned James J. Caffrey, Chairman (resigned
4-30-41) 12-3147)
Robert E. Healy Robert K. McConnaughey.
Leon Henderson (resigned 7-8-41) Richard B. McEntire
Edward C. Eicher, Chairman, vice Edmond M. Hanrahan
Mr. Frank Harry A. McDonald (from 3-26-47)
Sumner T. Pike
Ganson Purcell (from 6-1141)
Edmund Burke, Jr. (from 8-141)
Other suggestions for amending the registration and prospectus requirements of
Section 5 and related sections of the Act may be found in address of John J. Burns,
then General Counsel of SEC, before Convention of IBA, White Sulphur Springs, W.
Va., Oct. 28, 1935; Bates, The Waiting Period Under the Securities Act, 15 HARV.
Bus. REv. 203 (1937) ; S. 3985, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess., May 14, 1940; H. R. 10013,
76th Cong., 3rd Sess., June 6, 1940, the House counterpart of S. 3985; H. R. 4344,
77th Cong., 1st Sess., April 14, 1941; address of Commissioner McConnaughey before
the American Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc., Chicago, Ill., March 26, 1947.
62, See note 61 supra for the background of these proposals.
63. The industry proposals would continue the present limitations on offering and
selling activities in the period before the filing of a registration statement. The only
activity now permitted in that period is negotiation -between an issuer and any under-
writer; this is accomplished by excepting such negotiation from the definition of offer
and sale in Section 2(3) of the Act. The Commission agreed to this phase of the
industry's proposals.
64. INDUSTRY REPORT, supra note 33, at 87-89; Testimony of R. McLean Stewart,
Hearings, supra note 8, at 136-137.
65. Section 2(3) now provides: "The term 'sale,' 'sell,' 'offer to sell,' or 'offer
for sale' shall include every contract of sale or disposition of, attempt or offer to dis-
pose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value;
except that such terms shall not include preliminary negitiations or agreements be-
tween an issuer and any underwriter ..
The industry proposal would revise this part of Section 2(3) to read as follows:
"(a) The term 'sale' or 'sell' includes every sale or other disposition of a security or
interest in a security for value, and every contract to make any such sale or disposi-
tion. (b) The term 'offer to sell' or 'offer for sale,' or 'offer' includes every attempt
or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an order or offer to buy, a security or interest
in a security for value." CoisPARAw PRiNT, supra note 61, § 2(3) (a), (b), p. 2, lines
14-21.
66. Id. § 5 (b) (2), p. 29, line 23 to p. 30, line 5.
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panied by, or had been preceded within thirty days by a "limited pro-
spectus" or a "general prospectus." "' Thus, during the waiting period
it would be unlawful to make offers solely by means of an oral
communication.
The "identifying statement" would contain somewhat more elabo-
rate information than that now found in the "tombstone advertise-
ment"; ' but unlike the "tombstone advertisement," it could be dis-
tributed to investors before the effective date. The "limited pro-
spectus" would be a rather abbreviated selling circular of one to six
pages corresponding in scope and content to the present "newspaper
prospectus." 9 The "general prospectus" would be similar to the
statutory (i. e. Section 10) prospectus now in use: a rather extensive
summary of all material information concerning the security offered for
sale.70 But there would be two significant changes concerning its con-
tents and use. First, any of the information otherwise required to be
set forth in the general prospectus could be omitted which the Commis-
sion might by rule, regulation or order designate.7 ' Second, in order
that the "general prospectus" could be utilized during the waiting
period, there could be omitted from the prospectus, when it was cir-
culated during the waiting period, information as to the offering price,
underwriting arrangements and related data.72  Thus the "general pro-
spectus" in its pre-effective date form would be very similar to the
present red-herring prospectus; 73 however, although the existing pro-
cedure provides that a person who receives a red herring prior to the
effective date must be given a complete prospectus at or before the
delivery of the security to him, the proposed amendments would re-
67. Ibid.
68. The "identifying statement" would be a document which states from whom a
general prospectus could be obtained and in addition does no more than state by whom
orders will be executed; identify the security; state its price, yield, and conversion and
redemption privileges, if any; indicate the legality of the security as an investment
for banks, insurance companies, and fiduciaries; state the extent to which the issuer will
pay any tax on the income derived therefrom; and contain such other information as
the Commission may by rule or regulation permit. COMPARATIVE PRINT, § 2(10) (d),
p. 5, line 14, to p. 6, line 8. The present "tombstone advertisement" is described at
note 18 supra.
69. INDusTRY REPORT, supra note 33, at 123; CommissioN REPORT, supra note 61,
at 12; Hearings, supra note 8, at 326. By Sections 2(10) (b) and 10(b) (7) of the
COMPARATIVE PRINT the Commission could classify prospectuses for use as "limited
prospectuses" and prescribe for each class the form and contents which it may find
appropriate to such use and consistent with the public interest and protection of in-
vestors. The present "newspaper prospectus" is described at note 18 supra.
70. Section 2(10) (a) of the COMPARATIVE PRINT defines a "general prospectus"
as a prospectus, filed with the Commission, which on its face meets the requirements
of Section 10, but not including a "limited prospectus." In this paper the terms "gen-
eral prospectus" and "statutory prospectus" are used interchangeably. See discussion
of prospectuses under the existing Act, at note 34 supra.
71. COMPARATIVE PRINT, § 10(b) (1). The purpose of this proposal is to eliminate
the present difficulties inherent in the "general prospectus" because of its bulkiness
and unreadability. See note 34 supra.
72. COMPARATIVE PRINT, § 10(b) (2), p. 43, line 3, to p. 44, line 2.
73. The "red herring" prospectus is described at note 49 supra.
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quire that a person who received a "general prospectus" need only be
supplied with the omitted information."
(b) Sales. The .industry proposals would continue the present
prohibition against "sales" during the waiting period.
(2) After the Effective Date
(a) Offers. Under the amendments advanced by the industry to
govern distributive activities after the effective date, oral "offers"
would be permissible to the same extent as they now are under the
present statute. 5 In other words, oral offers might be made before
the purchaser had seen a copy of an identifying statement, a limited
prospectus or a general prospectus. Written offers, however, could
only be made by means of an identifying statement or in other written
forms provided that the offer was incorporated in, accompanied by, or
had been preceded within thirty days by a limited or general pro-
spectus.
7
6
(b) Sales. "Sales" would be divided into two classes: (i) those
made within seven days of the first date on which the security "was
bona fide offered to the public," and (ii) those made after seven days
of the same date.77  As to the latter, it would be unlawful to sell a
security, deliver any security for the purpose of sale, or after sale, or
collect or receive payment of any part of the purchase price unless the
purchaser was sent or given a general prospectus so that it would
normally be received by him not more than thirty days before the sale
and not later than the business day before such collection or receipt.
7 8
74. COMPARATIVE PRINT, § 10 (b) (2). This omitted information would have to be
given to the purchaser of the security prior to the sale; if given orally, it would have
to be confirmed in writing at or before the completion of the transaction.
75. This is accomplished by Section 5(b) (3) of the COMPARATIVE PRINT, p. 30,
lines 6-12, which prohibits offers by any written means other than an "identifying
statement," unless incorporated in, accompanied by, or preceded by a "limited" or "gen-
eral" prospectus.
76. CO PARATIW PRINT, § 5 (b) (3), p. 30, lines 6-12.
77. The industry, in making this division, urged that in the case of sales made
more than seven days after the effective date, an individual investor is less in need
of the protection furnished by the general prospectus than he is when he purchases
immediately after the effective date. The argument was advanced that when a pur-
chase is made a week or more after the effective date, the individual is not buying in
competition with such professional investors as banks, insurance companies and other
like institutions; that he will be helped in his appraisal of the security by the success,
or lack of it, which the issue has enjoyed during the days immediately following the
effective date; and that considerable information about the security will have become
available throughout the financial community because of the length of time during
which knowledge of the issue has been public. INDUSTRY REPORT, supra note 33, at
93; Testimony of R. McLean Stewart, Hearings, mpra note 8, at 195.
78. ComPARATIVE PRINT, § 5 (a) (2), p. 27, line 22, to p. 28, line 5. This is simi-
lar to the selling procedure which exists under Section 5(b) (2) of the present Act.
However, the industry urged that in being furnished a prospectus at least a day before
collection or receipt of the purchase price, the purchaser is receiving more protection
than under existing procedures in which he usually receives the prospectus concur-
rently with the delivery of the security. INDUSTRY REPORT, 94. See note 38 supra.
But this is a rather dubious argument, because in both cases the purchaser would be
committed before he has had an opportunity to examine a complete prospectus.
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As to the former, i. e., within seven days of the public offering date, it
would be unlawful to sell a security, deliver the security for purpose
of sale or after sale, or collect or receive payment of any part of the
purchase price unless the sales were effected pursuant to either of the
following two procedures."9
Procedure (I) : A general prospectus had been sent or given to
the purchaser so that it would normally be received by him not more
than thirty days, and not later than the business day, before the sale."0
Procedure (II) : (i) A general prospectus had been sent or given
to the purchaser, accompanied or followed by a written confirmation
of the sale; (ii) the confirmation had been sent or given not later than
the first business day after the day of the sale; and (iii) the confirma-
tion contained a statement, in such form as the Commission should
prescribe, that "it is a term or condition of the sale that it shall not
become effective if the purchaser, not later than noon . . on the first
business day after the day on which such written confirmation was
received . . . advises the seller that he has examined the general pro-
spectus and that he elects not to proceed with the purchase." It would
be unlawful for the seller to deliver the security or to collect or receive
payment of any part of the purchase price prior to the expiration of
the period during which the purchaser might elect not to proceed with
the purchase.81
B. Commission Counter-proposal of 1941
The Commission in its 1941 Report to Congress condemned the
procedure proposed by the industry to govern offering and selling
activity in the waiting and post-effective periods as unfair to public
investors and contrary to the basic objectives of the Securities Act."
The principal target of the Commission's objections was the selling
procedures advocated by the industry. Accordingly, the Commission
advanced a counter-proposal on this point: that in the case of all
sales, regardless of when they occur, the purchaser must receive the
statutory prospectus at least twenty-four hours before he contracts to
buy. 3 Moreover, the Commission stated that if this requirement were
79. CoMAATnV PRINT, § 5 (a) (3), p. 28, line 6, to p. 29, line 15.
80. This method of making sales is in accordance with the procedure suggested
by the Commission for all sales regardless of when they occur. Cf. COMPARATIVE
PRINT, § 5(a) (2), p. 26, lines 13-20. The industry stated that even if its proposals
were adopted, this method would be the one most usually followed since most under-
writers and dealers would not want to bear the risk involved in making sales subject
to an election on the buyer's part to rescind. Testimony of R. McLean Stewart, Hear-
ings, 174, 197.
81. COMPARATIVE PRINT, § 5(a) (3) (B), p. 28, line 17, to p. 29, line 15.
82. CoMMIssI ON REPORT, supra note 40, at 7-9.
83. Id. at 9. See COMPARATIVE PRINT, § 5 (a) (2), p. 26, lines 13-20, and note 80
mipra.
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accepted, it would concur (with but one exception) in the other phases
of the industry's proposed offering and selling procedure. The excep-
tion was that aspect of the industry recommendations which would
leave unchanged the present permission to make oral offers after the
effective date without prior use of any written material."'
C. Commission Staff Proposals of 1947
Early in 1947 the Commission resumed its pr6gram of joint study
of the Securities Act with industry representatives and other interested
groups. There emerged from these discussions a plan of amendment
put forward by a committee appointed by the Commission from mem-
bers of its staff to give special attention to the amendment program.85
The staff proposals, which deal only with Section 5 and related sec-
tions, differ from the Commission's 1941 position in several respects.
(1) During the Waiting Period 8
(a) Offers. The staff recommendations would permit offers to
be made orally or in written form. Written offers, unless made by
means of an "identifying statement," would have to be preceded or
accompanied by a statutory prospectus, complete except for price and
related data. The "identifying statement" apparently would be some-
what more limited in scope than the "identifying statement" proposed
by the industry in 1941; the statutory prospectus, on the other hand,
would correspond to the "general prospectus" of the 1941 proposals.
It will be noted that the staff recommendations differ in two re-
spects from the Commission's 1941 position. Whereas the Commis-
sion previously was opposed to oral offers unless preceded or accom-
panied by a statutory written document, T the staff would permit them
without such restriction. In addition, the staff proposal contains no
provision for a "limited prospectus."
(b) Sales. The staff proposals would continue the present pro-
scription of "sales" during the waiting period.
84. CommIssioN REPORT, 11. The Commission urged that the same procedure for
making offers should be followed both before and after the effective date, i. e., offers
could be made by means of an "identifying statement" or in any other written or oral
form if incorporated in, accompanied by, or preceded within thirty days by a "limited
prospectus" or "general prospectus." See Testimony of Commissioner Purcell, Hearings,
supra note 8, at 345. In the industry's opinion if oral offers after the effective date
were not permitted without any restriction, "the whole process of trading in a security
after the effective date would be made impracticable, if not impossible." INDUSTRY RE-
PORT, supra note 33, at 90.
85. Securities Act Release No. 3224, June 4, 1947; see note 61 supra.
86. As in 1941, no change is contemplated in the activity permitted before a regis-
tration statement is filed. See note 63 upra.
87. Under the industry's 1941 proposals oral offers during the waiting period could
be made only if preceded or accompanied by a "limited" or "general" prospectus. The
Commission conditionally agreed to this but objected to the industry's suggestion that
oral offers be permitted after the effective date without restriction, CommISSION RE-
PORT, supra note 40, at 11. See also note 84 supra.
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(2) After the Effective Date
The staff's 1947 recommendations for selling procedure after the
effective date are a substantial deviation from the Commission's 1941
position, and in many respects, follow the pattern established by the
industry's 1941 proposals.
(a) Offers. Offers after the effective date would be made in the
same fashion as during the waiting period, i. e., orally, by means of an
"identifying statement," or in any other written form if preceded or
accompanied by a statutory prospectus.88 The prospectus would have
to be complete in every regard; but the pre-effective prospectus could
be used if there were attached thereto the price and related data which
had been omitted."9
(b) Sales. The staff proposals outline three alternative methods
for making sales: (i) A sale could be made after effectiveness to a pur-
chaser who had been sent or given a statutory prospectus, complete
except for price and related data, so that it would normally have been
received at least two business days before the effective date, provided
the omitted information were supplied to the purchaser at any time
prior to the sale." (ii) Where no pre-effective prospectus had been
supplied, a sale could be made if the purchaser had been sent or given a
statutory prospectus, complete in all details, so that it would normally
have been received at least two business days before the making of the
sale or the contract to sell. (iii) If neither of the above methods were
followed, a sale could be made but the purchaser would have the un-
qualified right, within two business days after a complete prospectus
would normally have been received, to notify the seller of his election
not to proceed with the purchase. The prospectus and the confirma-
tion of the sale would have to bear a legend notifying the purchaser
of this right.
It can be seen that procedures (i) and (ii) taken together are
equivalent to the procedure advocated by the Commission in 1941 for
all sales, except that they contemplate the furnishing of a prospectus
at least two days, instead of twenty-four hours, before the making of
a sale. Procedure (iii) is substantially the same as the industry's 1941
proposal except that the right to rescind could be exercised within two
days after the receipt of the prospectus instead of by noon of the next
88. Permission to make oral offers without restriction in the post-effective period
is a departure from previous Commission policy. See note 87 supra.
89. The staff recommends that the Commission be allowed by rule or in individual
cases to require that a complete final prospectus be used after the effective date.
90. See note 74 supra. Here also the Commission would have the authority either
by rule or in individual cases to require that a complete prospectus be used, along with
a specification of the data omitted from the pre-effective prospectus, where "in its opin-
ion the public interest and the protection of investors required such action."
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business day, and would apply whether the sale was made within
seven days after the effective date or more than seven days after such
date.
IV. APPRAISAL OF THE PROPOSALS
The attitude of the Commission and of the industry concerning
the problems disclosed by experience under the Adt-the oral loophole,
he dissemination-solicitation distinction and gun beating-may readily
be discerned from the above proposals. The fundamental concern of
the Commission and its staff was to plug the oral loophole and to make
the statutory prospectus the main selling document. The industry, on
the other hand, while not unwilling that the statutory prospectus
should play a more important role than theretofore, was primarily
interested in eliminating the dissemination-solicitation distinction and
in being able to continue to do business on an oral basis. Elimination
of the dissemination-solicitation distinction, and the accompanying
legalization of gun beating, was acceptable to the Commission and its
staff provided the industry would agree to adoption of additional safe-
guards designed to make the statutory prospectus the main selling
document. The industry and the Commission were unable to reconcile
their differences in 1941; nor did they do so in 1947. Our resolution
of those differences follows.
A. During the Waiting Period
(1) Offers. The objective of the Securities Act that information
concerning the security should receive widespread dissemination dur-
ing the waiting period seems unassailable. But the desirability of the
accompanying proscription of all efforts to dispose of the security dur-
ing the waiting period is not equally apparent. The established pro-
cedure of underwriting in the United States generally involves a com-
mitment by the investment banker or syndicate to purchase the issue
at a price slightly less than the public offering price." If the banker is
to gauge the market accurately, he should be permitted to secure from
the dealers, who will sell the security to the public, information con-
cerning the likely reception of the issue; and the dealers in turn should
be permitted to consult their customers in order to acquire the desired
data. Reasonably accurate information concerning the likely public
reception of the issue assists the banker to reach an intelligent and
informed decision concerning the price to be paid to the issuer. The
information secured from the investing public thus performs a useful
economic function in that it helps the banker to make an informed
91. See p. 611 and note 11 supra.
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price judgment.92 If information concerning the security is to be dis-
seminated to the public, and if information concerning its likely recep-
tion is to be relayed back to the banker, it would be impracticable as
well as undesirable to prohibit all efforts to dispose of the security
during the waiting period. Impracticable, because the prohibition
would not be obeyed, as experience under the present Act has rather
conclusively demonstrated.9" Undesirable, because (i) such a prohibi-
tion would act as a deterrent to dissemination of information, again, as
experience under the present Act has shown,94 and (ii) governmental
legislation interfering with individual freedom of action should extend
as far as, but no farther than, is necessary to achieve the objective of
the legislation " and in this instance the objective can be accomplished
by less restrictive means.95
For these reasons it seems advisable to accept the industry's 1941
proposal to separate "offers" from "sales," and to permit offers during
the waiting period. Although there is obvious merit in the industry's
recommendation that oral offers be prohibited unless accompanied or
preceded by a limited or general prospectus, we are inclined to believe
that the staff's 1947 proposal unconditionally to permit oral offers in
the waiting period should be adopted. In the first place, it is doubtful
whether a prohibition of oral offers could effectively be enforced. The
same pressures responsible for gun beating under the present Act very
likely would lead to similar violations of the prohibition against oral
offers. Second, since a major portion of the securities business is con-
ducted over the telephone,96 it seems unwise to attempt to limit the
traditional procedure for doing business unless the objective of the
limitation can only or best be achieved by such a limitation; and, as
will be pointed out below, the safeguards proposed to govern sales in
the post-effective period should provide adequate protection.97  Finally,
we believe that the industry proposal for making oral offers during
the waiting period would tend to make the "limited" rather than the
"general" or "statutory" prospectus the important selling document.
Because the limited prospectus would be cheaper to prepare and dis-
seminate than the general prospectus, underwriters and dealers desiring
to make oral offers naturally would distribute the limited rather than
92. It might be urged that it is the responsibility and function of an investment
banker to have sufficient knowledge concerning the capital market to enable him to
price the issue without resort to the procedure described in the text. Our reply to this
argument is that undoubtedly the banker does have general information concerning
the market, but that the most useful and accurate information concerning the marketa-
bility of the offering in question can best be secured in the manner we have described.
93. See part II C of this paper, especially note 59 supra.
94. See part II B of this paper, especially note 46 sipra.
95. See part IV B (2) of this paper.
96. Text at p. 617 and note 38 supra.
97. See part IV B (2) infra.
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the general prospectus prior to or contemporaneously with the making
of the oral offer.9" Investors thus would be deciding whether to pur-
chase the security on the basis of that abbreviated document instead
of upon the general prospectus which contains in condensed form all
of the material information concerning the security. Investors' judg-
ments of whether or not to purchase a security should be based on the
complete document, rather than on a necessarily inadequate summary
of it. If present prospectuses are too bulky and complex, the answer
is to improve their quality, not to create an inadequate substitute."
It may plausibly be urged that if oral offers are not to be regu-
lated, a similar freedom should be extended to written offers. But
there are differences which may warrant different treatment of the
two classes of offers. The existence and character of written offers
may be proved with greater facility than in the case of oral offers; and
it is a much less burdensome interference with normal business prac-
tices to impose the following requirement in the case of written offers
than it would be to impose it in the case of oral offers. Accordingly,
we agree with the staff's 1947 requirement that if a seller wishes to
communicate with a prospective purchaser in writing, the writing must
be either (i) an identifying statement or (ii) any other writing pro-
vided it is accompanied or was preceded by a statutory prospectus
(which could omit price and related data if unknown at the time). As
stated in the staff's memorandum, "The 'identifying statement' would
be limited in content so that it would serve not as a selling document
but purely as a screening device to ascertain what persons were suffi-
ciently interested to warrant delivery to them of the statutory
prospectus." 100
(2) Sales. The prohibition of the present Act against sales dur-
ing the waiting period should, of course, be retained in the amended
version of the Act.
B. After the Effective Date
(1) Offers. The procedure to govern oral and written offers
after the effective date should, we believe, be the same as that which
we have recommended above concerning offers during the waiting
period, and for essentially the same reasons: it represents the least
possible interference with normal business practices, does not involve
virtually insuperable enforcement difficulties, and is supplemented by
the safeguards imposed on the procedure for making sales in the post-
effective period.
98. INDUSTRY REPORT, note 33 supra, at 90.
99. Proposals to empower the Commission to issue orders authorizing or directing
omissions from a general or statutory prospectus are more promising means for coping
with the problem of bulky prospectuses. See note 71 supra and text thereat.
100. Securities Act Release No. 3224, June 6, 1947.
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(2) Sales. The recommended abandonment of existing limita-
tions on offering activities during the waiting period, and the proposal
to permit oral offers after effectiveness, underscore the necessity of
evolving an appropriate procedure to govern sales after the effective
date. That procedure should protect public investors through prac-
ticable controls which will involve a minimum of interference with
normal business practices. The devices for achieving this objective
that have figured most prominently in the discussions between the
Commission and the industry are (i) conferring upon the purchaser a
power not to continue with the purchase in the event a statutory pro-
spectus had not been delivered a stated period before the sale took
place (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the "out clause") and (ii)
requiring the seller to deliver a statutory prospectus to the purchaser a
stated period-say 24 hours-before the sale takes place (hereinafter
sometimes referred to as the "24-hour requirement").' Enactment
of either of these proposals would be a long stride toward correction
of existing abuses and realization of the original objective of the
Securities Act that public investors should be enabled to reach informed
judgments concerning security offerings. As between the two, how-
ever, the 24-hour requirement embodies the preferable procedure.
Under the out clause procedure advanced by the industry in 1941
and by the staff committee in 1947, an investor who had "purchased"
a security before receiving a statutory prospectus could, within a stated
period after being furnished a prospectus, notify the seller of his elec-
tion not to continue with the purchase. It might be interesting, but
not particularly relevant or helpful, to speculate whether delivery of a
prospectus and the purchaser's failure to notify of his election not to
proceed with the purchase is a "condition precedent" to the existence
of a legal "sale," or whether non-delivery of the prospectus (or
delivery and notification of an election not to proceed) is a "condition
subsequent" to the "sale." For purposes of appraising the out clause,
analysis of the legal relations existing between purchaser and seller
must give way to the average purchaser's reaction; and it seems clear
that under either the industry's or the staff's version of the out clause,
the average purchaser's reaction would be, "Yes, I have made a deal
101. It should be noted that all of the proposals require not actual delivery of the
prospectus to the purchaser, but a sending of the prospectus "so that it normally would
be received" by the purchaser within the stated period. The risk of interruption in
ordinary mail service and risks of a similar character thus are imposed on the pur-
chaser rather than the seller. Underlying this provision is the thought that the seller
should not be required to insure receipt of the prospectus: This appeals to us as a rea-
sonable limitation on the seller's liability.
For ease of expression we shall, as we did in the text above, utilize the phrases
prospectus has been delivered," "delivery of a prospectus," etc., rather than the cum-
bersome phrase "sending a prospectus so that it normally would be received by the
purchaser not less than - hours before. . .
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with the seller. I have bought the security. But I can get out, if,
within a certain period after I receive the prospectus, I notify the seller
that I want to call the deal off." 102
If, as we are firmly convinced, investors would react in this man-
ner, the out clause is fatally defective in that it would permit securities
salesmen to induce investors to purchase on the basis of inadequate in-
formation orally conveyed. After the investor had made up his mind
to buy, he would then be given information on the basis of which he
could make up his mind to cancel his commitment. As SEC Com-
missioner Ganson Purcell stated before the House Committee in 1941:
"There is a fundamental difference between forming a judgment on
the basis of complete information and upsetting a judgment once
formed. The suggestion is to let the investor commit himself and
then get out of his commitment, if time and circumstances permit, when
that commitment has been based in the first instance on admittedly
incomplete information. . . . As a matter of fact, I suppose it is an
attribute common to man that once one has made up his mind on a mat-
ter he takes a certain pride in his decision and hesitates to reverse him-
self. There would indeed be an inertia on the part of an investor who
had decided he wanted to buy a security which would militate against
his studying the matter further after he had given his word to buy." 103
A related weakness of the out clause procedure arises from the
requirement that in order to take advantage of the out clause the pur-
chaser must give notice. Although the purchaser's inaction might be
due to other reasons-e. g., lack of time to examine the prospectus
because of pressure of other business, or failure to receive the pro-
spectus because of absence from home or office-he would nevertheless
be committed to purchase if he failed to act within the specified time,
which in the case of the industry's 1941 proposal might be a very
short period. 10 4 If it is desired that purchasers reach informed judg-
ments concerning securities, a procedure permitting, perhaps encourag-
ing, inaction seems an inappropriate means for realizing the objective.
102. It should be noted that the industry's 1941 proposal provides that the buyer
may elect not to proceed with the purchase "if, the purchaser, not later than noon . . .
on the first business day after the day on which the confirmation was received ....
advises the seller that he has examined the general prospectus and that he elects not
to proceed with the purchase." (Italics supplied.) The requirement of "examination"
might be interpreted to require the purchaser to justify his election not to proceed on
the basis of information contained in the prospectus. A purchaser might not have had
time to examine the prospectus and might therefore feel he was not justified in electing
not to proceed. See Hearings, 344. The staff's 1947 "out clause" proposal does not
contain the requirement of "examination" and therefore is preferable to the industry's
version in this respect.
103. Hearings, 343.
104. ". . . not later than noon . . . on the first business day after the day
on which . . . [the] confirmation [which might be accompanied by the prospectus]
was received by him. . . ." COMPARATIVE PRINT, supra note 61, at 28-29.
AMENDMENT PROPOSALS FOR SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 637
An additional defect in the out clause procedure is the danger
that a purchaser who elects not to proceed with the purchase will be
branded a "welsher" and blacklisted from participating in future offer-
ings. It is, of course, hazardous to predict the action of the industry or
of a substantial percentage of the members of the industry in the event
purchasers did utilize the out clause. But it seems highly probable
that the purchaser who took advantage of the out clause would find
that he was not invited to participate in future desirable offerings.
This, at least, was the opinion of the Commission in 1941."05 In any
event, it cannot be doubted that apprehension that he would be branded
a welsher and therefore excluded from future desirable offerings, would
deter many investors from taking advantage of the out clause.
The foregoing observations apply equally to the industry's 1941
and the staff's 1947 versions of the out clause. The industry's version
is defective for still another reason: under the industry's out clause
procedure purchasers who had acquired securities after the first seven
days of the offering would not be covered by the out clause. Successful
issues are often marketed within a very few days. Distributions
extending beyond a week would surely call for increased sales effort.
Precisely at that point purchasers should be afforded the maximum
protection.10  Yet, it would be precisely at that point that the industry
would withdraw the protection of the out clause.
It is for these reasons that we are convinced of the inadequacy of
any amendment program based on an out clause procedure. For-
tunately, the 24-hour requirement offers greater promise of providing
reasonable investor protection without imposing undue burdens on the
process of distributing new issues of securities.
Under the 24-hour requirement procedure it would be unlawful
to sell the security unless the purchaser had been furnished a statutory
prospectus 107 at least 24 hours before the sale. 08  In broad outline the
105. CommissioN REPoRT, supra note 40, at 8; Hearings, supra note 8, at 343.
106. See the statement of Commissioner Purcell at the House hearings: "It seems
to me that this [7-day] limitation withdraws protection from the investor in the very
situation where he is most in need of it and where the limitation of a 24-hour period
would be the least hindrance to the seller." Hearings, 344.
107. The prospectus might omit price and related data if unknown at the time of
delivery of the prospectus-which would almost always be the case if the prospectus
were distributed during the waiting period. Underwriters are unwilling to take risks
of market changes for any extended period and issuers also wish to take advantage
of any last minute market changes. Accordingly, the usual procedure is to file a regis-
tration statement which does not contain price terms. Then, a few days before the date
of the public offering, price terms are filed as an amendment to the registration state-
ment and the Commission is requested to "consent" to. the filing or otherwise accel-
erate the effective date. See text at p. 614 and notes 21 and 22 supra. During the time
between the original filing of the registration statement and the filing of the price
amendment, the prospectus cannot, of course, set forth price and related data. Such
a prospectus is often referred to as a "priceless prospectus" or a "red-herring" pro-
spectus.
108. See second paragraph of note 101 supra.
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proposal would operate approximately as follows: Immediately after a
registration statement had been filed with the Commission, the under-
writers would circulate copies of the identifying statement among
dealers and public investors. 10 9 The underwriters also would make
extensive use of the telephone to communicate with dealers and the
public. Dealers in turn would distribute identifying statements to
their customers and discuss the offering with them in face-to-face and
telephone conversations. The identifying statements and oral com-
munications would evoke expressions of interest from investors and
dealers, thus enabling dealers and underwriters to gauge the likely
demand for the issue. Underwriters also would be able to reach a
general decision concerning the dealers who would be available for
inclusion in the selling group. ' Then, after the Commission's staff had
examined the registration statement and had informed the registrant
concerning any deficiencies in the statement, copies of the prospectus
(complete except for unknown price and related data) would be sent
to interested dealers, and by them to investors who had expressed
interest in the security."0  Perhaps two or three days before the
effective date, price and related data would be filed with the Com-
mission in the form of an amendment to the registration statement "'
and also communicated by the underwriters to the dealers and by them
to their customers."' On the effective date, dealers would effect tele-
graphic purchases of their allotment from the underwriters and would
immediately telephone or personally visit customers who had already
received the prospectus and the omitted price data at least 24 hours
before. Sales could then be made, or if the time schedule were such
that the omitted price data could not be furnished to dealers or in-
vestors at least 24 hours before effectiveness, the proposal would
permit a sale to be made to any purchaser who had received the "price-
109. They might also distribute copies of the "priceless prospectus" (note 107
supra) at that time.
110. Assuming the prospectus had not been distributed previously, note 109 supra.
111. Note 107 .vpra.
112. See CoMMIssIoN REPORT, supra note 40, at 10-11: "If the 24-hour condition
suggested by the Commission were added to the proposal that offers be permitted be-
fore the effective date, it would be possible for the Commission to concur in most of
the collateral suggestions made by the securities industry. Thus, to prevent the
24-hour requirement from unduly delaying the marketing of securities, the Commis-
sion could concur in the proposal by representatives of the securities industry to per-
mit, before the effective date of the registration statement and subject to certain con-
ditions, the distribution of the general prospectus complete except as to price,
underwriters' commissions, and other related data not at that time available. Under
this plan the receipt of such a prospectus would start the 24-hour period running and
would permit the underwriters to set their machinery in motion before the effective
date. Thus immediately upon the registration statement's becoming effective an
underwriter could take a firm commitment from any investor or dealer to whom he
had given a prospectus 24 hours earlier, provided he furnished the omitted information
at the time of the firm commitment."
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less prospectus" at least 24 hours before, provided that the omitted data
was furnished immediately prior to the time of the sale. The same
general procedure would be followed in the post-effective period except
that then the prospectus would contain the price data, and therefore
there would be no omitted information to be furnished immediately
prior to the time of the sale." 3
The 24-hour requirement, in making the statutory prospectus the
main selling document, rather than an "unselling" document as under
the out clause procedure, provides adequate protection for the public
investor. It is difficult to see how the requirement would impose im-
practicable or undue burdens on the process of distributing new issues
of securities. But in the 1941 hearings the industry advanced two
principal objections to the 24-hour requirement.
The industry first pointed out that a somewhat inconvenient situ-
ation would arise in the case of an unsolicited offer to buy received by
a dealer after the effective date. 14  In such a case, the dealer could
not conclude the transaction but would have to furnish the prospective
purchaser with a prospectus and advise him to repeat his offer to buy
after a lapse of twenty-four hours. If the buyer did this or the dealer
was able to re-establish contact with him, then the sale could be made
if the securities were still available. 15
There is implicit in this objection the idea that securities in a
great measure sell themselves. But the industry's efforts to secure
greater latitude in the activity permitted during the waifing period
113. The problem of a seller's acceptance of a firm offer to buy made during the
waiting period deserves a word. We incline to the belief that underwriters and dealers
ought not be permitted to accept offers to buy made in the waiting period unless there
were some further action by the buyer after effectiveness. If this view were adopted
it would mean, of course, that a "firm offer to buy" actually constitutes only a state-
ment of intention to offer to buy, or to accept an offer to sell, after effectiveness. Our
reluctance to approve a procedure which would enable buyers to make firm offers in the
waiting period is based on the belief that under such a procedure buyers would be
subject to pressures to make such offers, which would then ripen into binding con-
tracts of sale after effectiveness. Even if it be assumed that such offers might be
revocable until accepted, we fear that purchasers would be reluctant to exercise the
power of revocation-for the same reasons they would be reluctant to utilize the "out
clause" procedure. The waiting period, it bears repeating, is not to be a period for
making sales.
114. INDUsTRY REPORT, supra note 33, at 94. Testimony of R. McLean Stewart,
Hearings, supra note 8, at 187, 188.
115. Of course, some dealers might conclude the sale without waiting the required
24 hours. To this extent the 24-hour requirement contains an incentive to "gun beat-
ing." However, consummation of the transaction would be a violation of the Act and
would subject the dealer to civil liability, criminal prosecution and administrative
action, and should be easier to detect and prove than present "gun beating" practices.
Moreover, violations of the 24-hour requirement in the post-effective period would
tend to be at a minimum since most dealers would try to get prospectuses into the
hands-of purchasers during the waiting period so as to be ready to conclude sales
immediately upon the effective date. The incentive for a dealer to get rid of his allot-
ment as speedily as possible can probably be counted on to override any desire he
might have to avoid circulation of the prospectus.
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indicates that this notion is in large measure contrary to the facts.
In the relatively few instances in which the prospective purchaser would
take the initiative no great burden would be imposed upon the dealer
since it is unlikely that the purchaser would be discouraged unless
what he read in the prospectus influenced him to change his mind."'
There is, of course, the possibility that an individual investor might
find that all of the securities had been sold when he renewed his offer
to buy. But the protection afforded to investors as a group by the 24-
hour requirement is well worth the price of these few individual
disappointments.
The industry's second objection was that even in the most care-
fully managed distributions "it is improbable that. . . a sufficient
supply of prospectuses" would be in the hands of all dealers in time
to enable them to get the prospectuses to their customers twenty-four
hours in advance of the effective date, and that this in turn would
create a tendency to dispose of new securities, especially those of high
quality, only in large financial centers where it would be comparatively
easy to distribute prospectuses during the waiting period,17  However,
we do not believe that the evidence advanced by the industry in the 1941
hearings demonstrates the impossibility of making adequate dissemina-
tion of prospectuses during the waiting period.
Perhaps the underlying basis of this industry objection is that
rather than being impossible to circulate prospectuses adequately, (i)
it would increase costs"" and (ii) might delay the distribution pro-
cedure to some extent."19 There was considerable testimony by in-
dustry representatives in the 1941 hearings concerning the extent to
which distribution costs had been increased by the existing statutory
116. The dealer would be held up for another 24 hours in making the sale and
thus disposition of his allotment might be delayed. However, the primary purpose of
the Act is to protect investors even if this must be done by sacrificing some of the
speed with which distribution is accomplished. See note 122 infra..
117. INDUSTRY REPORT, smipra note 33, at 95; Testimony of Edward H. Hilliard
of J. J. B. Hilliard & Son of Louisville, Ky., Hearings, supra note 8, -at 209-213; Tes-
timony of Rush S. Dickson, President of R. S. Dickson & Co., Inc., of Charlotte, N.
C., id. at 229-232.
This solicitude for "interior" investors is somewhat suspect. The statistics cited
by R. McLean Stewart of the Investment Bankers Association of America and the
tenor of his testimony indicate that it is a practice to sell securities as fast as possible
and that this is best accomplished in large financial centers. Hearings, supra note 8,
at 198-208. Moreover, the 24-hour requirement, as its operation was envisaged by the
Commission, would not have the effect which the industry seems to think it would.
Testimony of Commissioner Purcell, id. at 335-341.
118. See Testimony of Joseph W. Scribner of Singer, Deane & Scribner of Pitts-
burgh, Pa., Hearings, supra note 8, at 228.
119. Delay would result in the case of sales initiated after the effective date be-
cause the seller would have to wait at least twenty-four hours after his original con-
tact with the purchaser before concluding the transaction. In addition, acceleration
of the effective date might be refused or postponed if the Commission were not satis-
fied that there had been adequate circulation of the prospectus to prospective pur-
chasers.
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requirements, and the tendency of such increase to divert desirable
offerings from public to institutional purchasers. 2 ' The Commission,
on the other hand, took the position that any increase in costs had
been more than offset by reduction in underwriters' fees brought about
by the full disclosure provisions of the Act; the Commission attributed
the growth in institutional purchases to other factors.121 As a whole,
therefore, the testimony on this point of increased costs was incon-
clusive. Evidence of a much more compelling character should be
adduced before it is concluded that the 24-hour requirement would
entail such additional costs as to make it impracticable. The objection
that the 24-hour proposal would delay distribution should not be given
serious consideration unless it can be demonstrated that the delay
would reach such proportions as substantially to burden the distribu-
tion process.' 22 And, as previously stated, the 24-hour requirement
should not have this effect.'2 3  In our opinion, therefore, the industry's
objections do not go to the heart of the 24-hour requirement.
Although, for the reasons outlined above, the 24-hour require-
ment is to be preferred over the out clause, adoption of either proposal
would be a significant advance. In either case, underwriters and
dealers would endeavor to disseminate the "priceless prospectus" to
investors during the waiting period. They would then be in a posi-
tion to make the sale on the day of, or shortly after, effectiveness by
supplying the omitted price data immediately prior to the time of sale.
To the extent that sales were effected in this manner, investors would
be furnished the necessary information and the distribution period
120. See e. g., Testimony of Edward B. Twombly, Counsel for Committee on Re-
employment of Men and Money of the Commerce and Industry Assoc. of New York,
Hearings, mspra note 8, at 120-129, 479-481; Testimony of Frayser Jones of the Na-
tional Association of Manufacturers, id. at 490-492; Testimony of R. McLean Stew-
art, id. at 167-169; Testimony of Paul W. Loudon (representing investment bankers
of Minnesota), id. at 623-634.
121. Testimony of Commissioner Purcell, id. at 292-304, 571-601; see also Testi-
mony of Bernard J. Reis, Executive Director of the American Investors Union, New
York, id. at 639-646; Address of ex-SEC Commissioner George C. Matthews before
the Minnesota Statistical Assoc., Oct. 24, 1940; Margraf, Does Securities Regulation
Hinder Financing Small Business, 11 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 301 (1945).
122. Originally it was thought that the twenty-day waiting period would serve
to slow down the speed of distribution which was considered an evil of the American
securities business. However, the oral loophole, gun beating and acceleration have
succeeded in preventing the waiting period from accomplishing this objective. The
proposals discussed above which would permit offerings of a security before effective-
ness both orally and in written form are another concession to this almost insatiable
desire for haste. One wonders if this mania for speed has not gone far enough. If
the 24-hour requirement does apply some slight braking pressure to the distribution
process, it would be a step forward toward the goal which Congress considered desir-
able in 1933. Also since, as stated by industry representatives at the 1941 hearings
(Hearings, supra note 8, at 174, 177), the industry would generally endeavor to dis-
tribute prospectuses at least 24 hours before the effective date, delay in the instances
in which it was not possible to make advance distribution should be rather inconse-
quential.
123. See pp. 638, 639 supra.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
would not be delayed. In the ordinary case, then, of a distribution by
an underwriting group which had secured the issue through individual
negotiations with the issuer, either proposal would be practicable. But
when the issuer-underwriter arrangements result from competitive
bidding for the issue, difficulties would be encountered under either
proposal. In this situation the issuer files the registration statement
before bids are invited. Various underwriter groups then submit
sealed bids, and the award is made to the highest bidder. During this
time, the waiting period is expiring. On the day the successful bidder
is selected, or the day after such selection, the registration statement
usually becomes effective and the public offering begins. It would be
uneconomic for each group of bidding underwriters to distribute iden-
tifying statements and "priceless prospectuses" to dealers and for the
dealers in turn to distribute those documents to their customers: since
only one group of bidding underwriters will be successful, the docu-
ments distributed by the unsuccessful bidders would largely be wasted.
Also, the exceedingly short period between the date the successful
bidder is determined and the public offering begins does not provide
adequate time for distribution of identifying statements and pro-
spectuses. Therefore, in a competitive bidding situation, underwriters
and dealers could not, as a practical matter, disseminate "priceless pro-
spectuses" during the waiting period. Distribution of the issue thus
would be delayed, and underwriters and dealers would themselves be
"on the hook" for a longer period than otherwise.
Reference has already been made to the fact that the American
underwriting business is geared to speedy distribution, to minimization
of risk, to being "on the hook" for no longer than is absolutely neces-
sary. 24 The administration of the Securities Act has neither sought
nor achieved substantial reform of this phase of the underwriting busi-
ness.125 Underwriters still make their final commitments to issuers
only a few days before the security is offered to the public.' 28  They
still endeavor to carry the risk for the least possible time. Accord-
124. Supra part II, especially page 612. See also note 122 supra.
125. The Commission could have drastically altered American underwriting prac-
tices by refusing to "consent" to the filing of price amendments to registration state-
ments. Had it done so, the filing of a price amendment would begin a new 20-day
waiting period during which the underwriter would be committed to buy. See Dean,
supra note 55. Since the underwriter would be taking the risk of market changes for
that extended period, he would naturally exact a greater compensation than for a
shorter period. Or the usual pattern of distribution of new securities might have be-
come one of "best efforts" (supra note 11). However, the Commission did not bring
about such a basic change. Instead, it sought to encourage maximum dissemination
of information concerning the issue during the waiting period, and usually gave its
"consent" to price amendments. CommIssioN REPoRT 4. See also note 122 s-upra.
126. Supra note 107. See also testimony of R. McLean Stewart, Hearings, supra
note 8, at 159.
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ingly, any amendment suggestion which would increase the under-
writers' period of risk by as much as 24 hours-as would be the case
under either the 24-hour requirement or the out clause proposal in a
competitive bidding situation 2 --undoubtedly will be resisted by the
industry.
Perhaps the short answer to such an objection is that the public
interest in being informed outweighs underwriters' private interest in
minimizing risks. At the other extreme, it might be urged that securi-
ties required to be sold through the competive bidding procedure are
of such a character and subject to such supervision by governmental
agencies that public investors being offered those securities do not
require the protection of the 24-hour requirement or of the out clause.
Or an intermediate procedure might be evolved. 128  In any event, the
fact that exception or modification might be necessary in the case of
issues subject to competitive bidding requirements does not, in our
opinion, detract from the essential soundness of the 24-hour require-
ment.
1 2 9
C. Miscellaneous Related Proposals
There were, in addition to the proposals discussed above, two
other amendment recommendations which are sufficiently related to the
main proposals to warrant a word here.
The first pertains to expanding the jurisdictional base of Section
5. Under the existing statute, a seller who does not use the mails or
channels of interstate commerce in making offers or sales or in deliver-
ing the security, either before or after the effective date, is not subject
to the registration and prospectus requirements of the Act. An amend-
ment recommended by the industry would make these requirements
applicable if the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce were used at any time, or in any way, in offering a security
for sale, selling it, delivering it for the purpose of sale or after sale,
or collecting or receiving payment of any part of its purchase price.180
It is hardly necessary to state that the Commission and the staff ap-
127. Possibly less than 24 hours in the case of the industry's version of the "out
clause."
128. The various underwriting groups bidding for the issue might be required to
submit to the issuer or an independent representative of the underwriters the names
of the dealers to whom they wished to distribute "priceless prospectuses." Elimina-
tion of duplications on the lists might bring it down to manageable size. The issuer
might also exercise a reasonable discretion to refuse to supply prospectuses to bidding
groups whose record in similar competitive bidding offerings indicated that they were
very unlikely to be awarded the issue. Prospectuses could then be made available
for the rest of the dealers on the list. With all the eliminations, however, it is almost
certain that more prospectuses would be necessary than in the case of a negotiated
sale. But the interests of the investing public may well justify the additional expense.
129. We would make the same observation with respect to offerings of open end
investment companies, for which particular provision also would be required. See
Hearings, supra note 8, at 180-181, 320, 1394-1396.
130. INDusTRY REPoRT, supra note 33, at 87, 95.
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proved the recommendation. We too approve the proposal, and we
think its merits are sufficiently manifest that further discussion is
unnecessary.
The other miscellaneous related proposal involves suggested
changes in the requirements applicable to transactions by securities
dealers. The industry, Commission and staff were unanimous in their
approval of the provision of the present Act which requires a dealer
to comply with the prospectus requirements of the Act so long as he
retains any portion of an unsold allotment of an issue in which he
was a participant in the distribution. There was similar unanimity in
the disapproval of the provision of the present Act which requires all
dealers, whether or not members of the selling group, to comply with
the prospectus provisions for a period of one year after the date on
which the security was first offered to the public.
The industry proposed substituting for the one year requirement a
provision which would subject a dealer to the prospectus and out
clause requirements of Section 5 only so long as he (i) retains the
security purchased by him as a participant in the distribution group,
or (ii) still is participating in the distribution of the security by sell-
ing it on behalf of an issuer or underwriter, or (iii) still is participating
in a stabilizing account in connection with the distribution of the
security. 131 The staff's substitution for the one year requirement would
oblige a dealer in the selling group to comply with the prospectus and
out clause provisions of the Act for a period of three months after the
effective date; in addition, such a dealer would be required to comply
with those provisions so long as he retained any portion of his allot-
ment or the price of the security was being stabilized .1 2  The staff's
proposals would require dealers not in the selling group to use a pro-
spectus in making written offers during the first three months after
effectiveness; but the staff took no position as to whether dealers not
in the selling group would be required to comply with the out clause
procedure during the three month period.'
131. INDUSTRY REPORT, supra note 33, at 49. None of the proposals contains a
definition of the term "participating in a distribution." The industry's understanding
is that the term is intended ". . . to include a selling group member . . . any
dealer to whom an allowance or concession is made by a selling group member. ...
[and] a dealer purchasing from an issuer or an underwriter offering to dealers on a
first-come, first-served basis at a flat price under the market price. [It] would not
include a dealer acting as a broker for his customer, a dealer engaged in trading rather
than in distribution, or in general any dealer not engaged in the process of distribu-
tion." Id. at 51. (Italics supplied.)
132. Securities Act Release No. 3224, June 6, 1947.
133. It is our belief that so long as the initial distribution of the security is con-
tinuing, and under the staff proposal that period would be deemed to include the first
three months after effectiveness, investors who purchase securities from members of
the securities industry should be given all the benefits of Section 5, whatever form they
may eventually take.
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It will be noted that the industry proposal would exempt from
both the prospectus and out clause requirements offers and sales by a
dealer who acquired securities for his own account even though the
security was being distributed by the selling group at the time he made
such offers or sales. So long as the security is in the process of dis-
tribution to the public, a purchaser should receive the same protection
regardless of whether he buys from a dealer who is a member of the
selling group or from one who is not. In both cases it would be diffi-
cult for the purchaser to form an intelligent judgment without the in-
formation contained in the prospectus. The activities carried on by
the distribution syndicate, such as advertising and stabilizing, benefit
both classes of dealers. For these reasons the staff proposal to subject
all dealers to the prospectus requirements for a period of three months
is to be preferred to the industry recommendation.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 1
3 4
The declared objectives of the Securities Act of 1933 were to
retard the speedy securities distribution practices in vogue in the
'twenties and to provide the public investor with sufficient information
concerning the security to enable him to reach an informed decision
whether to purchase the security. Complete attainment of these objec-
tives has been thwarted by the "oral loophole," the difficulties inherent
in the dissemination-solicitation distinction of the Act, and the practice
of "gun beating." The proposals advanced by the Commission and
the securities industry would cope with these defects by authorizing
oral and written selling efforts in the waiting period and requiring
sales to be effected in accordance with either the procedure of the out
clause or that of the 24-hour requirement.
Oral efforts to dispose of securities should be permitted both dur-
ing the waiting period and after effectiveness because the securities
business has traditionally been conducted on an oral basis and because
other safeguards are provided. Although the out clause would be an
134. The emphasis of this paper on weaknesses in the registration and prospectus
requirements of the Securities Act should not be permitted to obscure the Act's im-
pressive contribution to investor protection. Because of the Act and Commission
action under it, hundreds of defrauding sellers of securities have been enjoined, and
hundreds of others have been indicated and convicted. 10 SEC ANN. REP. 29, 189-
190 (1945). Nearly 200 stop orders suspending deficient registration statements have
been issued, and thousands of other registration statements have been subjected to the
careful scrutiny of the Commission's expert staff. Id. at 18. More important, prob-
ably, than its formal actions have been the reforms effected by the Commission,
through informal procedures, in regard to responsibilities of directors, underwriting
methods, accounting techniques, and disclosure of corporate practices. Cf. LANDIS,
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 109 (1938). But despite these significant accomplish-
ments, the optimum in investor protection will not be realized until remedial legisla-
tion has corrected existing defects in the registration and prospectus provisions of the
Act.
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advance over existing practices, it is seriously defective in that it
makes the prospectus an "unselling," rather than the selling, document.
The 24-hour requirement, although not representing the millenium,
would provide adequate protection to the public investor while not
unduly burdening the process of distributing securities issues.
The procedures we have recommended would effectively close the
"oral loophole," eliminate the dissemination-solicitation distinction,
and enable the Commission and the courts to curb illegal "gun
beating." The net effect would be to provide the investing public with
the data needed to reach an informed decision whether to purchase
the security. And because the recommended procedures are adjusted
to the needs and practicalities of the securities business, the procedures
should command the respect and obedience of the industry. Current
underwriting practices designed to minimize risks would not be sub-
stantially affected by the procedures. But since the investor would
always have at least 24 hours to study the prospectus, the objectionable
aspects of the high pressure, blind buying practices of the 'twenties
should not recur.385
135. In recommending enactment of remedial legislation, we do not overlook the
drastic changes in underwriting practices which will be effected if the Government is
successful in the anti-trust action now pending against prominent investment bankers.
United States v. Henry S. Morgan et al., Civil Action No. 43-757 (S. D. N. Y., Octo-
ber 30, 1947). In the first place, there is no assurance that the Government will be
successful; second, successful conclusion of the action will only come after a hard-
fought, protracted contest extending over a period of years; and finally, any of the
changes in underwriting practices sought to be effected through the judicial process
in the anti-trust action can be achieved by appropriate legislation enacted by Congress
at the time it amends the registration and prospectus provisions of the Securities Act.
